Are there Still Limits on Partisan Prejudice?

Article Summary

Introduction

This article examines whether affective polarization increased among the American public between 2014 and 2017. Pundits and scholars have suggested that this period was marked by intense negative campaigning, particularly during the 2016 presidential election. The authors pose two questions to explore whether this growing hostility among the political elite is also reflected in the general public: Do perceptions of increasing partisan hostility correspond to actual changes in the public’s affective polarization? Is it possible to exacerbate partisan animosities further, given the already high levels of affective polarization before pundits observed increased hostilities among the political elite? In addressing these two questions, the authors provide evidence to determine if the reported rise in hostility among political elites around the 2016 election also corresponds to aggravated partisan prejudice among the public. If there was a parallel increase in partisan animosities during this period, this evidence may support the view that affective polarization is driven by elites. If levels of affective polarization remained the same, this could be attributed to either a lack of elite influence on partisan emotions or a ceiling effect, where affective polarization was already so high before the 2016 election that no further increase induced by elite rhetoric would be possible. By presenting extensive survey evidence from 2014 and 2017, the authors contribute to our understanding of how elite animosities correlate with partisan animosities in the public.

Analytical Approach

The authors draw upon two similar surveys conducted in 2014 and 2017. Between these surveys, pundits have pointed to heightened hostilities among political elites, particularly during the presidential campaigns of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Both of these campaigns were characterized by intense negative campaigning. By comparing levels of partisan animosities between 2014 and 2017, the authors assess whether these increased elite hostilities are reflected in their survey data. The authors first examine whether affective polarization, as commonly measured in surveys, is higher in 2017 than in 2014. They rely on their own survey data as well as ANES data. The authors then evaluate changes in different facets of partisan prejudice:

1. Antilocution (speaking poorly of the other party and being critical of criticism toward one’s own party): The authors assign respondents to either a news article in which FOX News criticizes the Democratic party or a newspaper article in which MSNBC criticizes the Republican party. Respondents are then asked whether they would endorse the article for publication.
2. Avoidance (trying to avoid contact with supporters of the other party): The authors simulate a game and ask respondents to select other players to form a team with. They record whether respondents prefer to include a more educated player from the other party or a less educated but Independent player in their team.
3. Discrimination (disapproving of in-party misbehavior): First, respondents are asked whether they disagree with a decision to use tear gas in a peaceful protest involving either in- or out-partisans. A second question asks whether respondents would disapprove of an investigation into an alleged illegal donation to an in- or out-partisan PAC. The authors compare the means between the 2014 and 2017 samples and assess whether the mean responses are statistically different from each other. To investigate whether partisans who were already highly affectively polarized in 2014 became even more polarized in 2017, the authors implement linear regression models to examine the relationship between affective polarization, survey year, and the outcome measure.

Main Findings

Overall, the authors did not identify any significant increase in affective polarization and partisan prejudice between 2014 and 2017. The only notable change was that more respondents agreed with the decision to use tear gas in a peaceful protest involving out-partisans in 2017 compared to 2014. Furthermore, the authors found no evidence to suggest that highly affectively polarized partisans became more supportive of partisan prejudice in 2017 compared to 2014. Despite the hostile rhetoric from political elites during the 2016 presidential campaign, partisan animosities did not undergo substantial changes within the same time period.

Implications

Many pundits assert that U.S. politics has experienced heightened partisan animosities among both political elites and the general public. However, the results of the article indicate that partisan prejudices did not intensify in the aftermath of the 2016 presidential campaign. By employing various innovative outcome measures, the authors offer comprehensive evidence that contradicts the assertion that partisan prejudice has become more widespread among the U.S. public. While the authors exercise caution in making causal claims, these descriptive findings are incongruent with an elite-driven explanation of partisan animosities in the United States.

Questions left unanswered

The authors suggest studying two potential explanations for their findings. First, the results may be attributed to the limited impact of elite rhetoric on affective polarization. Second, it is possible that affective polarization in the U.S. public has already reached such a high level that it cannot be further exacerbated by elite animosities.

Methods and Analysis

Was the study and its analyses pre-registered?: No

Did the study rely on proxy variables to measure polarization?: No

Were standard p-value thresholds used (p<.05 or 95% Confidence Intervals that don’t overlap zero)?: Yes

• Largest p-value presented as significant: 0.05

Were correlational results interpreted with causal language?: No

Limitations / Weaknesses

The authors do not look more closely into differences between partisan camps and potential changes in partisan prejudice in those subgroups. For instance, Democratic but not Republican respondents could have become more affectively polarized between 2013 and 2017, or vice versa. While the survey sample might have been too small to investigate these partisan differences, future survey research could examine changes in partisan animosities among partisan groups over time.

Open Data & Analyses

Does the article make the replication data publicly available?: No

Does the article make the replication analysis scripts publicly available?: No

Article Citation

Westwood, S. J., Peterson, E., & Lelkes, Y. (2019). Are there Still Limits on Partisan Prejudice? Public Opinion Quarterly, 83(3), 584–597.

Bibtex

@article{Westwood.2019,
 author = {Westwood, Sean J. and Peterson, Erik and Lelkes, Yphtach},
 year = {2019},
 title = {Are there Still Limits on Partisan Prejudice?},
 pages = {584--597},
 volume = {83},
 number = {3},
 journal = {Public Opinion Quarterly}
}